Abstract-We present a Tag-KEM/DEM framework for publickey encryption with non-interactive opening. Using this framework we explain the idea behind an existing scheme, that is, we obtain some of such schemes as an instantiation of our framework. In addition, using our framework, we can obtain a scheme which can encrypt arbitrary-length plaintexts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public-key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) [1] is an extension of public-key encryption, in which the receiver can produce a non-interactive proof for any given ciphertext. This proof can show that the given ciphertext is decrypted to some public plaintext, without compromising confidentiality of any other ciphertexts. This primitive is introduced by Damgård et al. [1] , for the use in secure multiparty computation, in particular for claiming that a sender of an encrypted message deviates from the protocol by sending fake information in an encrypted form.
There is a subtlety in designing a PKENO scheme, which is evidenced by the fact that one of the constructions by Damgård et al. was broken and repaired by Galindo [2] . The subtlety partly stems from the (implicit) use of a KEM/DEM construction, and partly from the fact that the proof includes the session key encapsulated in the KEM part. The attack is possible because the adversary can replace the DEM part of the target ciphertext with a random DEM ciphertext, and the adversary can ask the proof even for this modified ciphertext. This proof includes the session key of the KEM part, which is the same as that of the target ciphertext, and hence it compromises the confidentiality of the target ciphertext.
This subtlety was overcome by the repair due to Galindo [2] and the following schemes due to Galindo et al. [3] and Lai et al. [4] . All these schemes overcome the subtlety by somehow binding the DEM part to the KEM part in a publicly verifiable way, and making any modification break this binding. For such a modified ciphertext, the receiver no longer needs to produce a proof, but only needs to claim that the binding is broken, which is publicly verifiable.
Although there are secure PKENO constructions, their design principle is relatively ad hoc, and there is no unified paradigm for designing a secure PKENO scheme. In addition, as Galindo's attack suggests, to encrypt a session key using some KEM (with the non-interactive opening feature) and to encrypt the plaintext using the session key, are insufficient for constructing a secure PKENO scheme. The existing secure PKENO schemes somehow circumvent this subtlety, but it is not clearly understood how it is accomplished. OUR CONTRIBUTION. For a better understanding of the existing secure PKENO schemes, we formalize the above idea behind them by adopting the Tag-KEM/DEM framework by Abe et al. [5] . More specifically, we formalize the notion of Tag-KEM with Non-interactive Opening (Tag-KEMNO) and prove a KEM/DEM composition theorem for such a KEM scheme. This KEM/DEM composition theorem can explain how the previous schemes [2] , [3] , [4] circumvent the aforementioned subtlety.
Tag-KEMNO (and Tag-KEM) have an ability to bind some message, called a tag, to a ciphertext. Furthermore, the security definition of Tag-KEMNO ensures that a ciphertext for some tag can be securely opened under a different tag, without compromising the session key encapsulated under the former tag. In our construction, this mechanism is used to bind the DEM part to the KEM part. More specifically, the DEM ciphertext is used as the tag. This way, even if the DEM part is replaced with another ciphertext, the KEM part can be securely opened under the new tag (i.e., the new DEM ciphertext).
As a by-product, our Tag-KEMNO/DEM framework enables us to expand the plaintext space of PKENO schemes in a generic way. Note that previous constructions do not support such arbitrary-length plaintexts, with exceptions of Galindo's scheme [2] and Dachman-Soled et al.'s scheme [6] . Any other schemes are only able to encrypt a single group element. A straightforward adoption of the KEM/DEM construction to encrypt long messages is potentially dangerous as illustrated by Galindo's attack. In contrast, our Tag-KEMNO/DEM framework enables us to securely expand the plaintext space, without suffering from attacks like Galindo's.
II. PRELIMINARY
Here we give the definitions of cryptographic primitives used in this paper. PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION WITH NON-INTERACTIVE OPEN-ING. A PKENO scheme consists of the following five algorithms [1] .
• PKg(1 λ ) → (ek , dk ). The key generation algorithm takes as an input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs the pair (ek , dk ) of an encryption key and a decryption key.
• PEnc(ek , M) → C. The encryption algorithm takes as inputs an encryption key ek and a plaintext M , and outputs a ciphertext C.
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We then give the definition of the confidentiality requirement [1] . Definition 1. A PKENO scheme is indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext and proof attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage Fig. 1 , and in the guess phase, the adversary is not allowed to submit C * to either PDec or PProve.
We give the definition of soundness of proofs (called the committing property), which was defined by Galindo et al. [3] . 
DATA ENCAPSULATION MECHANISM.
A data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) scheme is defined by the following two algorithms [5] .
• DEnc(K, M ) → χ. The encryption algorithm takes as inputs a session key K and a plaintext M , and outputs a ciphertext χ.
The decryption algorithm takes as input a session key K and a ciphertext χ, and outputs a plaintext M . For correctness, we require that the following conditions: For any session key K and any plaintext M , it holds that
We require the DEM scheme to satisfy passive security [5] .
Definition 3. A DEM scheme is secure against passive attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage |Pr[Exp Fig. 1 , and K is the set of session keys associated with the DEM scheme.
BILINEAR GROUPS. In our instantiation, we make use of bilinear groups. Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes as a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a tuple (p, G, G T , e) where p is a prime, G and G T are multiplicative groups of order p, and e : G × G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We say that the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds if it is infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, 
III. TAG-KEM WITH NON-INTERACTIVE OPENING
Now we define a new cryptographic primitive named Tag-KEM with Non-interactive Opening (Tag-KEMNO). A Tag-KEMNO scheme consists of the following six algorithms.
• KKg(1 λ ) → (ek , dk ). The key generation algorithm takes as an input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs the pair (ek , dk ) of an encapsulation key and a decapsulation key.
• KKey(ek ) → (ω, K). The session key generation algorithm takes as inputs an encapsulation key ek and outputs a pair of state information ω and a session key K.
• KEncap(ek , ω, t) → ψ. The encapsulation algorithm takes as inputs an encapsulation key ek , state information ω, and a tag t ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a ciphertext ψ.
• KDecap(dk , t, ψ) → K/⊥. The decapsulation algorithm takes as inputs a decapsulation key dk , a tag t, and a ciphertext C, and outputs a session key K or the rejection symbol ⊥.
• KProve(dk , t, ψ) → θ. The proof algorithm takes as inputs a decapsulation key dk , a tag t, and a ciphertext ψ, and outputs a proof θ.
• KVerify(ek , t, ψ, K, θ) → 1/0. The verification algorithm takes as inputs an encapsulation key ek , a tag t, a ciphertext ψ, a decapsulation K, and a proof θ, and outputs 1 or 0 indicating the validity of the proof.
For correctness, we require the following conditions: For any security parameter 1 λ , any key pair (ek , dk ) ← KKg(1 λ ), and any tag t ∈ {0, 1} * , (1) for any state information and session key (ω, K) ← KKey(ek ), it holds that KDecap(dk , t, KEncap(ek , ω, t)) = K and (2) for any possibly invalid ciphertext ψ it holds that KVerify(ek , t, ψ, KDecap(dk , t, ψ), KProve(dk , t, ψ)) = 1. Tag-KEMNO-CCPA (λ) is defined in Fig. 1 , and in the guess phase, the adversary is not allowed to submit (t * , ψ * ) to either KDecap or KProve, and K is the set of session keys associated with the scheme. Tag-KEMNO-commit is defined in Fig. 1 .
IV. THE TAG-KEMNO/DEM COMPOSITION THEOREM
In this section we present our generic construction of PKENO from Tag-KEMNO and DEM. The construction is presented in Fig. 2 .
Theorem 6. The proposed construction is indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext and proof attacks, if the underlying Tag-KEMNO scheme is indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext and proof attacks and the underlying DEM scheme is secure against passive attacks.
Proof: Let A be an adversary against the PKENO scheme. For the proof of security, we consider the following sequence of games.
• Game 0. This game is identical to Exp PKENO-CCPA (λ).
• Game 1. In this game the challenge ciphertext is modified to use a fresh session key K instead of using the session key K encapsulated in ψ * . More precisely, the experiment executes the following procedure to generate the challenge ciphertext: 
Proof of Lemma 7:
We construct an adversary B KEM that attacks the indistinguishability of the underlying Tag-KEMNO scheme. The description of B KEM is as follows:
• B KEM (find, ek , K * ). B KEM first chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and runs A(find, ek ). For a decryption query (ψ, χ), B KEM issues the decapsulation query (χ, ψ) to its decapsulation oracle, and receives K. If K = ⊥, B KEM returns ⊥ to A, and otherwise it runs M ← DDec(K, χ) and returns M to A. For a proof query (ψ, χ), B KEM issues the decapsulation query (χ, ψ) to obtain K and issues the proof query (χ, ψ) to obtain θ. ). For decryption queries and proof queries, B KEM replies as in the find phase. In this step, B KEM cannot obtain the decapsulation and proof of (χ * , ψ * ) from its oracles. However, this does not cause failure of the simulation, because A is also not allowed to submit such the query. When A outputs 
Proof of Lemma 8:
We construct an adversary B DEM which attacks the security against passive attacks of the underlying DEM scheme. The description of B DEM is as follows. runs A(find, ek ). For a decryption query (ψ, χ) , 
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
Finally, combining the lemmas, we have that
From the assumption that the underlying schemes are secure, we have that the above is negligible, which completes the entire proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 9. The proposed construction is committing if the underlying Tag-KEMNO is committing and the decryption algorithm of the underlying DEM scheme is deterministic.
Proof: Let us consider an adversary A against the committing property. We then show that there exists a reduction B such that if A successfully breaks the committing property of the PKENO scheme, B successfully breaks the committing property of the underlying Tag-KEMNO scheme.
The description of B is as follows: Given an encapsulation key ek and the decapsulation key dk , B runs A(1 λ , ek , dk ) and obtains (C, M, π, M , π ); then B parses C to (ψ, χ), π to (K, θ), and π to (K , θ ); finally B outputs
We then analyze this B. Let (C, M, π, M , π ) be an output of A and let C = (ψ, χ), π = (K, θ), and π = (K , θ). We then argue that assuming this output satisfies the winning condition of A, the output (χ, ψ, K, θ, K , θ ) satisfies the winning condition of B. More specifically, assuming PVerify(ek , C, M, π) = 1, PVerify(ek , C, M, π ) = 1, and M = M , we argue that KVerify(ek , χ, ψ, K, θ) = 1,
KProve(dk , t, ψ):
and e(C 1 , θ 1 )/e(C 2 , θ 2 ) = K return 1 else return 0 Fig. 3 . An instantiation of Tag-KEMNO from the DBDH assumption.
KVerify(ek , χ, ψ, K , θ ) = 1, and K = K . Due to the construction of PVerify, we have that KVerify(ek , χ, ψ, K, θ) = 1 and KVerify(ek , χ, ψ, K , θ ) = 1.
In order to show that K = K , for contradiction we assume that K = K . We have two cases:
For the case (1), due to the construction of PVerify, we have that M = M = ⊥, which contradicts to the assumption that M = M . For the case (2), due to the construction of PVerify, we have that M = DDec(K, χ) and M = DDec(K , χ). Because K = K and DDec is deterministic, we have that M = M , which is again a contradiction. In any case we have a contradiction, thus we have that K = K .
Therefore, for any case, whenever A satisfies the winning condition of its experiment, B satisfies its own winning condition.
V. INSTANTIATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section we show an instantiation of our framework. The instantiation is shown in Fig. 3 . This instantiation is obtained by modifying the PKENO scheme by Lai et al. [4] and adapting this scheme to our Tag-KEMNO framework. This scheme is indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext and proof attacks if the DBDH assumption holds, and the hash function family is collision-resistant. The scheme is proven committing unconditionally. We omit the proofs of the security of this scheme due to the page limitation, but it can be done by following the proof of the original scheme. EXPLAINING AN EXISTING SCHEME. When instantiating this scheme in combination with a one-time pad in G T , we exactly obtain Lai et al.'s scheme. This construction explains the idea behind Lai et al.'s scheme, in particular, how Lai et al.'s scheme prevents Galindo's attack. We remind the readers that in Galindo's attack the adversary replaces the DEM part of the challenge ciphertext and queries this modified ciphertext to the proof oracle. In this way the adversary obtains the encapsulated session key behind the challenge ciphertext, and breaks the confidentiality of the challenge ciphertext. In Lai et al.'s scheme this malleability of the ciphertext is prevented by binding the DEM part to the KEM part. Namely, this scheme uses the DEM ciphertext as the tag of the KEM ciphertext to resist Galindo's attack. EXPANDING THE PLAINTEXT SPACE. If we want to expand the plaintext space to support arbitrary-length plaintexts, we can combine our Tag-KEMNO scheme with a DEM which supports arbitrary-length plaintexts. Such a DEM can be obtained using a pseudorandom generator, namely, expanding the key to the same length as the plaintext and then taking XOR of the plaintext and the pseudorandom string. We also note that in this way we obtain a generic method for obtaining a PKENO scheme which can encrypt arbitrary-length plaintexts by following our Tag-KEMNO/DEM framework.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 26 · 9413.
